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This paper attempts to make a contribution to the study and understanding of the 
phenomenon of globalisation and its interplay with national politico-economic 
systems. How did globalisation resonate and/or dominate in different national 
contexts? What was the role of national political economies and domestic institutions 
in this process? What role did specific institutional actors played in it? Focusing on 
the materialisation of globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland, the paper presents 
three main findings: (i) the reproduction of the Greek and Irish politico-economic 
systems during the 1990s was dominated, to a significant extent, by the same set of 
meanings and practices (ii) the way in which this set of meanings and practices 
emerged in the two countries was fundamentally different: in Greece it defined a new 
zone of contestation, whereas in Ireland it defined a new zone of fundamental 
consensus (iii) after the end of the 1990s, these two different facets of hegemonic 
globalisation seemed to converge. The paper draws on these findings to examine the 
role of political economy and domestic institutions in the communication of the 




Examining Facets of the Hegemonic:  The Globalisation Discourse in Greece and 
Ireland 
 
Globalisation has been experienced differently in different countries and by different 
social actors. In some cases it was heavily politicised and produced new social 
cleavages and conflicts, whereas in others it remained beyond politics and ideology, 
and was treated either as a fact of life or a unique opportunity for development and 
prosperity. To understand the phenomenon of globalisation in its entirety we need to 
examine the conditions and forces that produce, govern and relate these different 
facets of globalisation. For, this will allow us to understand what defines the unity of 
the phenomenon of globalisation, and therefore its conditions of existence and 
change.  
 
This paper attempts a modest contribution to the above endeavour. Its first aim is to 
focus on the stage-of-formation of globalisation. Instead of taking globalisation as a 
given, the paper aims to explore how political actors produced the phenomenon of 
globalisation. The second aim is to account for the role of domestic institutions and 
political economy in the communication/generation of globalisation. The overall aim 
then is to bring globalisation under the microscope of comparative institutional 
analysis in a way that will enrich both the study of globalisation and domestic 
institutions.  
 
Globalisation is construed in this paper as a hegemonic discourse. The latter is defined 
in a Foucaultian manner as a set of practices and meaning that produce the object and 
processes of which they speak (Foucault, 1972: 49). I find this conceptualisation of 
globalisation useful for three reasons. (a) It does not treat globalisation as an end-
product, as something given and stable. In contrast globalisation is conceptualised as a 
dynamic set of practices and meanings that are productive of their subjects and 
objects. (b) It abolishes a superficial analytical and ontological distance, that is found 
in many positivistic projects, between the production of social agents and the 
production of their social environment. Thus, for the approach proposed here, 
significant changes in the environment of social agents (for instance the liberalisation 
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of financial markets or the introduction of flexibility practices in the labour market) 
signify changes in the (re)production of social agents themselves. In this manner, 
globalisation is produced by political actors but at the same time it produces these 
actors. That is, agents write their history and change their societies, but within not 
without them. (c) It allows us to transcend the dichotomy between material and 
ideational globalisation. To study globalisation as a hegemonic discourse, it is to 
study both practices and meanings; both material and ideational factors.  Thus, there 
is nothing exclusively ideational in the definition of globalisation as a hegemonic 
discourse (see also Ernesto Laclau and Roy Bhaskar, 1998: 9).  
 
The focus of the paper is on how the hegemonic discourse of globalisation 
(henceforth used interchangeably with the concept „globalisation discourse‟) was 
materialised in two different institutional settings, Greece and Ireland. By 
materialisation here I mean the process through which the set of practices and 
meanings that define globalisation came to be actualised as new policy debates, new 
policy initiatives, and more broadly as a new politics at the domestic level. Most 
important examples here include the privatisation of public companies, the 
liberalisation of capital accounts, the deregulation of different economic sectors, the 
introduction of flexibility in labour market, the reform of the corporate tax regime, or 
more general struggles over the role of state in the economy, or the usage of the 
concept of globalisation itself. Furthermore, the paper focuses on the second half of 
the 1990s, when, according to most analysts, the „globalisation of the globalisation 
discourse‟ took place.   
 
The research findings presented here suggest that in Greece globalisation discourse 
emerged as a multilevel societal struggle over the definition of what was at stake in 
political, economic, social and cultural terms. Thus the emergent meanings and 
practises of globalisation discourse acquired a heavily politicised and forcefully 
contested character. On the other hand, in Ireland the same meanings and practises did 
not generate contestation but consensus. They constituted the underlying givens of the 
Irish polity and the key institutional actors treated them as if they stood outside the 
sphere of politics and ideology. Thus, in Greece globalisation emerged as a new 
political, whereas in Ireland it emerged as a new apolitical. 
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These findings are then used to examine the following research questions. 
 
1. Is the nature of political economy sufficient to account for the materialisation 
process of hegemonic discourses?  Here I examine the „goodness-of-fit‟ 
hypothesis (among others see Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Borzel and Risse, 2000; 
Caporaso et al 2001) in the case of globalisation discourse. This hypothesis, for 
the purposes of this paper, reads as follows: the degree and intensity of the 
adaptational pressures at the national level depend on the degree of the „fit‟ or 
„misfit‟ (i.e. the compatibility) of the national institutions and practices with those 
promoted by the hegemonic discourse of globalisation.     
 
2. Is the nature of domestic structures sufficient to account for the materialisation 
process of hegemonic discourses? Here, the focus shifts from the analysis of the 
nature of political economy to the broader structures of societal interest 
organisation and state-society relations (Schmitter, 1979; Cawson, 1978; 
Lehmbrunch, 1979). These structures are important because they define the ways 
in which societies negotiate domestically social change and continuity (see also 
Schmidt, 2002).  
 
3. Can the combination of the above two factors (i.e. the nature of political economy 
and the nature of interest representation) account for the materialisation process of 
hegemonic discourses?        
  
It should be stressed here that the above questions are not treated in this paper as 
formal hypotheses, the validity of which will be tested against specific empirical 
evidence. Our purpose is not to gather empirical information in order to test 
hypotheses, but to elucidate what had really happened in these two countries, and on 
this basis to reflect on the explanatory capacity of the factors involved in the above 
questions. In this manner our case studies aspire to play not a hypothesis-testing, but a 
hypothesis-generating role (see Lijphart, 1971: 691-693).   
 
It must be clear by now that although the subject of the paper is the globalisation 
discourse, the issue in question is not the causal force of ideational factors in world 
politics and economics. Rather our main concern is with the role and function of 
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domestic factors in the materialisation of hegemonic discourses, as well as with the 
nature of this materialisation process itself. Consequently our study is not a study of 
ideas. The purpose is to examine, changing politico-economic arenas, in two domestic 
national settings, in order to understand the generation and communication of 
globalisation as a new dominant „reality‟ in world politics and economics. On this 
basis, in the evolving interdisciplinary debate among the various strands of 
institutional analysis (see Campbell and Pedersen, 2001), this paper joins with those 
approaches that underline the fundamental role of „translation‟ that takes place at the 
national level.  Yet, for this paper, this translation is, and must be construed and 
studied as a constitutive part of the writing of the „original text‟. 
 
The last issue to be addressed here is what are the reasons for and benefits from 
comparing Greece and Ireland. First, both countries are members of the European 
Union, so the „regional dimension‟ is kept constant.  Moreover, the two countries 
have similar, prime-ministerial political systems, similar political cultures 
(traditionally involving an underdog behaviour and strong clientelistic relations), but 
significantly different political economies. Greece is usually classified in the 
Continental/Mediterranean model of political economy, whereas Ireland is classified 
in the Anglo-Saxon model (see, Rhodes and Mény, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Yet, in real terms, these general models of political economy are inefficient/unhelpful 
in describing our case studies.  For instance, Irish political economy is characterised 
by a strong social partnership, which is a defining characteristic of the Continental 
model of political economy (Hardiman, 2002). Furthermore, the state has played a 
different role in Irish economy in comparison to the ideal type of the Anglo-Saxon 
model (see O‟ Riain and O‟ Connell, 2000). To account for the inefficiency of these 
general models to describe our case studies, we break them down into two 
components: nature of political economy and nature of domestic structures. The 
nature of political economy is defined in terms of two interrelated factors: the degree 
of the „state control domain‟ (see Table 1) and the degree of regulation in a country‟s 
economy (see Table 2).   On the other hand, the nature of domestic structures is 
narrowly defined in terms of the existence, or not, of a consociational, well 
institutionalised and well-functioning structure of interest representation (for a 
classical study see Schmitter, 1979). The following section presents the main findings 
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from our case-study analysis, and the next one assesses the role of these two factors in 
the materialisation of globalisation discourse.  
 
Table 1.  Ranking of Selected EU Countries According to their ‘State Control 
Domain’ 
0-6 indicator from least to more state control 
 
Domain Sub-Domain 
Country State Control Public Ownership Involvement in 
Business Operation 
 
United Kingdom (UK) 0.55 0.03 1.22 
Ireland (IE) 0.94 1.32 0.46 
Finland (FI) 1.51 3.28 1.90 
Norway (NO) 2.11 3.72 2.51 
Sweden (SE) 2.68 2.25 0.55 
Greece (GR) 2.83 3.39 4.50 
Austria (AT) 3.19 2.36 1.77 
Italy (IT) 3.87 4.44 3.26 
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Table 2.  Overall Regulatory Approaches in Selected OECD Countries 





Source: Nicoletti et al., 1999: 34 
 
 





The literature on the emergence of globalisation discourse in specific countries is not 
as developed as one would expect. Significant contributions in this regard include the 
works of Hay (2001) and Kjaer and Pedersen (2001) on the diffusion/translation of 
neoliberal norms in the UK and Denmark respectively. The analysis of the 
deployment of the discourse of globalisation by New Labour in Britain, by Hay and 
Watson (1999), has also been an important contribution. Hay and Watson argued that 
the impact of globalisation on the British political economy „may be more rhetorical 
than substantive, but no less real for this‟ (ibid.: emphasis in the original; see also 
Rosamond, 1999).  Pushing this line of inquiry further, Hay and Rosamond (2000) 
attempted one of the first mappings of the different ways in which the phenomenon of 
globalisation has been conceptualised and treated in different European countries, 
using as case studies Britain, France, Germany and Italy. They concluded that in all 
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cases globalisation was strategically deployed to legitimate specific social and 
economic reforms. They also found that the mode and characteristics of that 
deployment remained „strikingly different‟ in different national settings (ibid.: 22). 
More recently, Smith (2005) attempted one of the first in-depth, country-specific 
studies, on the impact of globalisation discourse, focusing on the Irish case. 
Confirming the analysis of Hay and Watson (1999) she claimed that „[i]n acting as if 
globalisation were a material reality, Irish policy makers may actually be creating the 
very outcomes they attribute to globalisation itself‟. This research was then pushed 




There are however differences in the way that globalisation discourse is 
conceptualised in this paper and in the above literature. In the latter much of the 
emphasis is on narratives and strategic deployment, whereas here it is on the 
(re)production of actors and domestic realms. The two approaches, however, are not 




The methodology  
 
To capture the materialisation of globalisation discourse, I analysed national 
institutional actors that dominate in the production and reproduction of domestic 
public discourses and policies. In particular, I examined political parties, worker 
unions, employer associations, the Church and the Press. The analysis of these actors 
was based on the systematic analysis of key, official, periodical publications (see 
below) over a period of six years (1995-2001). Thus, rather than capturing all 
domestic voices on globalisation, the aim of the research was to capture voices with a 
significant effect in politics and the policy process. If other actors, such as the anti-
globalisation movement or academics, had such a voice we expect to capture, at least 
part of it, through the channels/actors that are examined. The inclusion of a press 
sample is an important safety belt in this regard. The chosen pool of social actors does 
not exhaust the national institutional settings under examination. Yet, the „signals‟ 
one gets from the selected actors, spread as they are through the body politic, are able 
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to capture trends and changes beyond any sectoral or narrow defined institutional 
boundaries.  
 
The purpose of our investigation was to trace whether and how globalisation 
discourse was implicated in the vocabularies, ideological proposals, visions, policies 
or strategies of the social actors in question. To do so, a „double reading‟ of the 
analysed official documents was adopted. A first reading aimed to examine where, 
how frequent, in what context and for what purpose the term globalisation was used.  
The second reading aimed to examine what were the dominant objects (including 
themes, practices, policies, rationalities) of these documents irrespective of the 
term/concept globalisation. The dominant objects that came to the surface through this 
second reading were then contrasted with the various dominant objects of the 
globalisation discourse itself (e.g. flexibility, liberalisation, deregulation, speculative 
capital) to find out whether there was a relationship between them or not. The 
findings from the various national actors were then brought together to assess what 
was the impact of globalisation discourse on the national level overall. 
 
The research strategy followed here allowed us to study globalisation in its 
complexity and multiplicity, without demanding its reduction to a single process or 
object. It let the social actors speak for themselves, and set on their own the limits and 
the rules of globalisation‟s definition. In this way, the paper attempted to capture the 
conditions of unity of globalisation discourse. That is, the social space in which the 
various objects, meanings and processes of globalisation discourse „emerge and are 
continuously transformed‟ (Foucault, 1972: 32). Foucault argues that in order to 
analyse a hegemonic discourse one must focus on the conditions of co-existence of 
these dispersed and heterogeneous objects, meanings and processes, and study „the 
system that governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, 
the way in which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they 
undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement and replacement‟ (ibid.: 34); that 








The Main Political Parties  
 
The study of the political parties was based on the analysis of their national election 
manifestos. In particular, the 1996 and 2000 electoral manifestos were studied in the 
case of Greece, and in the case of Ireland those of 1997 and 2002.  The political 
parties examined are the following. 
 
Greek Political Parties Irish Political Parties 
 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement - 
PASOK (left-to-the-centre) 
Fianna Fail - FF  
(conservative party) 
New Democracy - ND  
(right-to-the-centre) 
Fine Gael - FG  
(conservative party) 
The Communist Party of Greece – KKE 
(traditional communist party) 
Labour Party - LP  
(left-to-the-centre) 
Coalition of the Left and the Progress - 
Synaspismos (left/progressive party) 
Progressive Democrats -PD  
(right-to-the-centre/liberal) 
  
The above study revealed two very different modes of communication/materialisation 
of globalisation discourse.  In Greece the discourse of globalisation emerged as a new 
zone of contestation, as a new point of reference through which political parties came 
to re-conceptualise what was at stake in economic, political and social terms. Thus, 
globalisation, conceptualised either as a dangerous dynamic that could lead to „a new 
barbarism‟ (PASOK, 1996), or as a new form of imperialism (KKE, 1996), „the 
domination of market over society‟ (PASOK, 1996; Synaspismos, 2000), a „policy 
justification instrument‟ (KKE, 2000; Synaspismos, 2000), or, on the other hand, as a 
„new reality‟ (ND, 1996, 2000) or even as a significant opportunity for the 
development of Greece (PASOK, 2000: 10), came to dominate and redefine the terms 
of antagonism between the Greek political parties.  
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Interestingly, there were changes in the positions of the political parties during the 
period under examination. For instance, the party in government, PASOK, shifted 
between the two national elections from a negative conceptualisation of globalisation 
to a proactively positive approach in which „market liberalisation, globalisation, the 
restructuring of the production...constitute[d] the driving forces for development‟ 
(PASOK, 2000: 10). Moreover, even when the term globalisation was avoided in the 
party realm, this seemed to be a statement on globalisation itself. For instance, New 
Democracy, after 2000 began to use the more neutral concept of globality 
(παγκοζμιόηηηα) (see for instance ND, 2000: 32), thus implicitly taking a (rather 
negative) position towards the concept of globalisation.     
 
In Ireland, on the other hand, the discourse of globalisation emerged as a new zone of 
consensus, the constituent meanings and practices of which remained beyond public 
deliberation, ideological contestation or party antagonism (see also Phelan, 2007). It is 
indicative that the concept of globalisation itself was rather absent from the party 
political scene. Three out of the four main Irish parties (FF, FG, PD) made no 
reference to the term globalisation in their 1997 and 2002 manifestos. On the other 
hand, the main „objects‟ of economic globalisation (e.g. deregulation, privatisation, 
tax cuts) were ever-present in Irish politics. Yet, these objects did not define a new 
zone of contestation, but rather a set of taken-for-granted policies and practices. Thus, 
the Irish political parties redefined their identities, visions, strategies, critiques and 
policy suggestions, not through a new zone of contestation, but rather through a new 
zone of a somewhat subliminal consensus that defined what was not to be discussed 
or disputed. In this process, the role and influence of the institution of social 
partnership was all-powerful.  
 
Along the above lines, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats set as 
their main governmental objective to do whatever was required in order Ireland to 
remain attractive to „mobile capital investments‟ (see FG, 1997: 4; FF, 2002: 26, 29-
30; PD, 1997, 2002).  The most telling statement, however, with regard to the above 
consensual „non-ideological‟ space of Irish politics, was one coming from the left. 
The Labour Party declared that it was „committed to a strong market economy based 
on competition‟ (LP, 1997: 11), and that its objective was „[t]he prioritisation of 
enterprise and innovation as key elements in the creation of wealth‟ (ibid., 6). Yet, as 
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in Greece, some parties gradually changed their stance towards globalisation. For 
instance, the Labour Party adopted by 2002 a more traditional European Left stance 
that treated globalisation as a „gross injustice‟ and as a threat for „the social and 
economic rights of the individual‟ (LP, 2002: 1). In addition, after 1997, FG 
developed a critique of the phenomenon of the „Celtic Tiger‟ that had many things in 
common with cultural critiques of globalisation (see for instance FG, 2002: 22). This 
critique, however, was focused on the redistribution of wealth rather than the 
redefinition or reconsideration of the core policies undertaken.  
 
 
The Social Partners  
 
The second key group of institutional actors that was examined in the two countries 
was the social partners. While studying this group, it is important to keep the 
developments at the EU level as a significant backdrop. After the mid-1990s the need 
for adjustment to the „new international environment‟ and the need for deregulation 
and flexibility had been at the top of the agenda of both the EU in general and UNICE 
in particular
2
. In addition, since the mid-1990s the social dialogue between the 
European employers‟ associations (UNICE, CEEP) and workers‟ unions (ETUC) had 
been enhanced, while with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 this dialogue was 
institutionalised (see Hoffmann et al, 2000; Berndt and Platzer, 2003). Finally, 
relevant events and developments at the international level, such as the ILO annual 
conferences or reports published by OECD and IMF, had also an impact on the social 
partners‟ discourses and strategies.  
 
To examine the engagement of employers with globalisation discourse, I focused on 
the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) and the Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation (IBEC) and analysed their Annual Reviews (1995-2002) and the main 
public pronouncements of their leaders
3. Both organisations are the main „voice‟ of 
private business in their countries (for the Greek case see Mavrogordatos, 1988; 
Lavdas, 1997; for the Irish case see Murphy, 1999; Murphy and Roche, 1997). On the 
other hand, the study of the workers was based on the study of the Greek General 
Confederation of Labour (GSEE) and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).  
GSEE is the main, national-wide association that represents workers and employees in 
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the private sector, whereas ICTU is the single umbrella organisation for trade unions 
in both the Republic and Northern Ireland (for the Greek case see Mavrogordatos, 
1988; Lavdas, 1997; Ioannou, 1999; and for the Irish see Murphy and Roche, 1997; 
Murphy, 1999; Gunnigle et al, 2002). In the case of GSEE I analysed its monthly 
newsletter Enimerosi (published by the GSEE‟s ‘Institute of Labour–INE‟), whilst in 
the case of ICTU I examined the biennial Reports of the Executive Council and the 
Reports of Proceedings (RP) of its biennial Delegate Conferences. The main findings 




The pattern of engagement of employers with globalisation discourse in the two 
countries was similar. On the one hand, they did not use the term or develop a 
discourse on globalisation as such.  On the other hand, as one would expect, both 
organisations promoted passionately an „economic globalisation‟ agenda.  Thus the 
dominant objects of economic globalisation (e.g. flexibility, tax cuts, liberalisation, 
deregulation, privatisation) were at the core of their public pronouncements and 
policy suggestions. Moreover, the views of the leaders of the two organisations on the 
nature of the changes underway were very close. In Greece, Iason Stratos argued that 
„globalisation and the need for adjustment to market forces is not something new for 
SEV; it is what SEV has been fighting for since the late 1980s‟4. In a similar manner, 
Anthony Barry in Ireland congratulated the government in 1997 for following policies 
„which largely reflected the policy objectives for which...IBEC...had campaigned over 
the years‟ (IBEC, 1997: 3; see also p. 7).  
 
There are, however, two interesting differences in the broader social context in which 
IBEC‟s and SEV‟s strategies and policies were developed.  In Greece, and mainly 
after 1997, the concept of globalisation became more and more ideologically charged.  
Thus, the avoidance of the use of this concept by SEV can be attributed to its effort to 
avoid associating its policy proposals with an increasingly negatively charged 
concept.  This was not the case in Ireland.  On the contrary, considering the language 
factor (i.e. English) and Ireland‟s proximity to the UK and USA (through the Irish 
diaspora and business) one would expect a wide dissemination of the concept of 
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globalisation. Contrary to these expectations, the concept of globalisation was more 
visible in the discourse of the SEV rather than of the IBEC. 
 
The second difference concerns the place of the discourses of the two organisations 
within their broader public discourses.  In Greece, SEV was leading the domestic pro-
economic globalisation agenda. In Ireland, IBEC faced strong criticism and pressure 
for not being active enough in the promotion of economic globalisation policies.  In 
particular, the best-selling Irish broadsheet, the Irish Independent, was criticising 
IBEC throughout the 1990s as being part of the „old economy‟, a „dinosaur‟, the voice 
of Irish big banks and semi-state companies
5




On the other hand, the concept of globalisation came, if in slightly different time-
frames, to re-order and dominate the discourses of workers.  In the case of GSEE this 
happened in 1997, whereas in the case of ICTU it took place a year later
6
. The first 
question to be raised then is what was there before these discursive shifts.  What was 
it that globalisation changed or continued in the discourses of the two unions?   
 
In the case of GSEE, the central point of reference and object of critique during the 
period 1995-1997 was „neoliberalism‟. Globalisation acquired a considerable position 
in GSEE‟s vocabulary in 1996, but it was only in 1997 that it became the new 
defining conceptual framework through which GSEE read its environment and 
produced its strategies, policies and vision.  In this process globalisation came to be 
conceptualised as a „justification instrument‟ used by the government and the 
employers to promote policies against the vested interests and living conditions of the 
workers (see Enimerosi, no 44 and 45, 1999; no 61-62, 2000). 
 
In the case of ICTU globalisation did not seem to have replaced any other dominant 
concept or point of reference.  What did seem to happen is that ICTU itself changed 
the way it engaged with the discourse of globalisation.  Thus, globalisation was 
present in ICTU‟s discourse since 1995. Yet, this early understanding and 
mobilisation of the concept of globalisation was associated with developing countries 
and broader issues of international development (see for instance ICTU, 1997: 5, 61).  
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It is in this regard that 1998 seems to signify a shift.  From being an „out there‟ 
developmental issue, globalisation began to be treated as an „in here‟, first order, 
domestic issue.  This new type of engagement contested openly, if not the results, the 





The study of the Church in the two countries was based on the analysis of the 
discourses of the Heads of the Churches; Archbishop Christodoulos in Greece
7
 and 
Cardinal Connell in Ireland
8
 (for the role of church in Greece see Ware, 1983; 
Stavrakakis, 2002; and in Ireland see Inglis, 1998; Kissane, 2003).  
 
In Greece, Archbishop Christodoulos launched a ferocious attack against 
globalisation. He portrayed it as a major and immediate threat for European societies 
in general and Greece in particular, and as a development that was associated with 
economic exploitation, identity and cultural annihilation, the „forces of evil‟ and „the 
destruction of Christianity‟ (Christodoulos, 2000; see also Christodoulos, 1998, 
1999). Cardinal Connell, on the other hand, made no references to globalisation. 
Instead he launched a ferocious attack on the concept and nature of the „Celtic Tiger‟, 
relating it to a „sad spectacle of poverty and exclusion‟9. He also described the 
contemporary economic system as „unchecked capitalism‟, arguing that „we are so 
full of the Celtic tiger that anything else seems unthinkable‟10.  
 
Although the referent objects of the two religious leaders were different, the content 
of their discourses was almost the same. They both had as their focal points the issues 
of national identity, tradition, cultural homogenisation, secularism, social 
estrangement, depersonalisation, individualism, consumerism, poverty and 
exclusion
11
.  Thus, although their targets were different (i.e. globalisation vs. the 
Celtic Tiger), they addressed the same issues, pointed to the same problems, and 
sensed similarly the nature and consequences of the changes underway.   
 
There is, however, one important difference in the nature of the two discourses.  The 
discourse of the Greek Church was based on an outside-in logic.   External forces and 
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interests had penetrated and attempted culturally to annihilate European societies and 
Greece.  Thus, no matter how it was promoted or expressed at the national level, the 
source of the threat, according to the Greek Church, was both external and externally 
driven.  In contrast the Church discourse in Ireland, albeit stressing the same 
„symptoms‟ as its Greek counterpart, was an inside-out discourse. Its principal object 
of critique was the Celtic Tiger, the most impressive manifestation of the Irish 
economic miracle, and not external forces driven by globalisation or otherwise.  It is 
interesting that this remained the case despite the concern of Pope John Paul II with 
globalisation. Thus, to address the same problems the Church in Ireland focused on 
the Celtic Tiger, whereas the Church in Greece turned to globalisation.      
 
   
A press sample            
 
The aim of this section is to capture the role of press both as an autonomous agent and 
as a mirror of society, i.e. both as a major agent in terms of reality-construction, and 
as a mirror that reflects and represents the prevailing social concerns and relations of 
power.  The sources that were selected for this purpose was the Sunday edition of 
VIMA in Greece (the best selling Sunday newspaper for most of the period under 
examination), and the daily edition of The Irish Times in Ireland (the second best-
selling broadsheet)
12
.   
 
The comparison of the aforementioned press sources enhances the picture that has 
already been formed through the analysis of the other institutional actors.  Compared 
to the references to globalisation found in VIMA, the references found in The Irish 
Times are minimal.  Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, the absolute number of 
references found in the daily Irish paper (6 papers per week) was lower than those 
found in the Sunday edition of the Greek paper (i.e. 1 paper per week) each and every 





Figure 1: A Comparison of References to Globalisation between the daily The 























Considering that The Irish Times is in English (so, a new term did not have to be 
created, and/or the term globalisation did not have to be translated, or otherwise 
appropriated for domestic use) then, indeed, the extremely low number of references 
to globalisation found in The Irish Times (in comparison to VIMA) is contrary to all 
expectations.  This situation seems to change in 2001, when the references to 
globalisation in The Irish Times exceeded those found in VIMA.   
 
The high number of references to globalisation in VIMA must manifest the centrality 
of globalisation both as an object and as a prism of analysis; both as news and as a 
way of reading the news.  Furthermore, the gradual increase of the references must 
reflect the gradual domination of globalisation in the discourses of key institutional 
actors.  The opposite conclusions can be drawn in the case of Ireland.  Globalisation 
was not present in the public discourse, as this was reflected in The Irish Times, either 
as a news item, or as a way of reading the news.  Moreover, the concept of 
globalisation was not implicated in the discourses of institutional actors, as these were 




Synopsis & Conclusions 
 
The first observation to make is that there is a significant difference in the use of the 
concept of globalisation in the two countries. In Greece it emerged as a new referent 
point that dominated in the vocabulary, policies and strategies of the key-institutional 
actors. On the contrary the concept of globalisation was relatively absent from the 
Irish public discourse, especially up to the year 2000. Yet, globalisation discourse is 
conceptualised in this paper as a productive set of practices and meanings that is not 
reducible to any single word or exclusive ideational aspect. On this basis, there are 
three important conclusions to draw from the above findings. 
     
First, the reproduction of the Greek and Irish politico-economic systems during the 
period under investigation was dominated to a significant extent by the same 
meanings, practices and points of reference.  This does not mean that one finds the 
same practices (e.g. flexibility in labour market) to have been implemented to the 
same extent in the two countries.  It means that – either as taken-for-granted 
assumptions or as highly politicised and contested policy concepts and strategies – 
these meanings and practices functioned as focal points that defined the terms of 
public discourse reproduction, and the stakes, identities, strategies and power 
relationships of the actors involved. In this regard globalisation discourse, as a 
delineation either of the socially given, or of the socially contested, seems to have 
supplied the common ordering principle/force (based on a specific stock of objects, 
meanings, practices and policies) on the basis of which both the Greek and the Irish 
politico-economic systems were being restructured.   
 
The second conclusion to be drawn is that, although the stock of meanings and 
practices that was present in the two countries was, with few exceptions (e.g. the term 
globalisation) the same, the way in which this stock was present in the two cases was 
fundamentally different.  In Greece the hegemonic/globalisation was communicated, 
and thus materialised, as a multi-level struggle over a new political.  Most social, 
political, economic and cultural stakes had to be thought through, redefined and 
fought for anew within Greek society.  In Ireland the hegemonic/globalisation was 
communicated, and thus materialised, as a set of practices and meanings that stood 
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outside the political; beyond politics and ideology. It delineated not a zone of 
contestation, but a zone of fundamental consensus; the underlying givens of Irish 
politics and economics. The critique of Celtic Tiger by Cardinal Connell remains a 
seeming exception in this regard. Yet, even if this criticism helped to the generation of 
a cultural critique of Celtic Tiger, it did not lead to a broader politicisation of the main 
economic policies that produced and sustained the Celtic Tiger. Thus the findings of 
our research point to two different facets of hegemonic globalisation. In Greece it 
emerged/materialised as a new political, whereas in Ireland it emerged/materialised as 
a new apolitical.    
 
The last conclusion is a more tentative one and refers to the dynamics of the 
materialisation of globalisation discourse in the two countries. Thus, while during the 
first part of the period under investigation (i.e. 1995-1999) the different facets of the 
hegemonic seemed to grow stronger and stronger, during the last part of the period 
under investigation (i.e. 2000-2002), these opposing dynamics seem to change, and 
divergence seems to have given its place to convergence.  Thus, in Ireland since 2000 
there was gradually developed a trend towards the politicisation of the „apolitical‟. 
This new dynamic was manifested in the change of ICTU‟s understanding and 
treating of globalisation, in the new discourse on globalisation developed by the 
Labour party, and in the adoption of the cultural critique of the Celtic Tiger by Fine 
Gael. This new dynamic had at least two sources: (a) There was a domestic dynamic 
towards politicisation that was led by the failure – real or perceived – of the 
„apolitical‟ and its underlying institutional apparatus (mainly the social partnership) to 
fulfil certain promises (e.g. reduction of social disparities, recognition of unionism). 
(b) There was also a dynamic that was produced by the communication within Ireland 
of Ireland‟s (neoliberal) image abroad, and in particular within the European Union.  
On the other hand, a similar but reverse trend can be traced in Greece.  Thus, some 
highly politicised issues, such as part-time employment, through their 
quotidianisation seemed to be treated as less political within the Greek public 
discourse. For instance, the labour movement‟s struggle against flexibility was 
gradually transformed into a new bargain on what the (inevitable) promotion of 
flexibility should be exchanged with. Finally, as has already been argued, the EU had 
a significant role in this convergence process, acting as a powerful generator of 
economic globalisation objects, policies and practices.  
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It is now time to use the above findings and conclusions in order to examine the three 
research questions presented in the introduction of this paper. The issue at stake here 
is how the differences in the materialisation of globalisation discourse in Greece and 
Ireland are to be explained.   
 
 
Political Economy, Domestic Institutional Arrangements and Hegemonic 
Discourses 
 
Is the nature of political economy enough to account for the materialisation process 
of hegemonic discourses?   
 
The nature of political economy is one of the first factors to be considered in the 
explanation of the observed different facets of the hegemonic.  The main hypothesis 
here would be that there must be a certain degree of „genealogical compatibility‟ 
between the conditions in which a hegemonic discourse originates, and the conditions 
that a hegemonic discourse in turn generates.  Thus in our case, one could assume that 
the practices and meanings that were generated by the hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation (e.g. liberalisation, flexibility, deregulation, privatisation, corporate tax-
cuts) would be more or less taken for granted, or smoothly absorbed in political 
economies that were based on institutional arrangements that were conducive with the 
globalisation discourse (i.e. political economies that have a small state control domain 
and low degree of regulation in the economy), whereas they would generate 
controversy, tension and clashes in political economies that were based on different, 
non-compatible arrangements (for instance the continental/Mediterranean political 
economies).   
 
Yet, the above analysis is characterised by significant conceptual and practical 
limitations. It is based on a conceptualisation of globalisation as a predetermined 
phenomenon, independent from state policies and actions, and it portrays states as 
static structures, stripped of any agency and strategic capacity. Two specific examples 
would help to clarify this point. The percentage of part-time employment in a country 
is usually treated as an indicator for the degree of labour market flexibility (the higher 
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the percentage of part-time workers, the higher the degree of flexibility). In 1992 the 
percentage of part time employment in Greece was 4.5% of the total employment, in 
Portugal 7.2%, in Ireland 9.1%, in Germany 14.5% and the UK 22.9%. By 2002 part-
time employment had remained unchanged in Greece at 4.5%, whereas it had 
increased by 57% in Portugal (usually classified in the same model of political 
economy with Greece), by 81% in Ireland, by 43.4% in Germany (the main 
representative of the Continental model) and by 9.2% in the UK (source: Eurostat, 
European Commission). There are two points to make here. First, the above example 
advances the argument that it is wrong to conceptualise globalisation as something 
that was taken for granted by genealogically compatible political economies. In the 
above example Ireland, i.e. a „genealogically‟ compatible political economy, was not 
the EU15 member state that made the least changes (less adaptation) but, in contrast, 
the one that adopted the most proactive stance and experienced the most significant 
change in its labour market. Second, we see that to cope with the same policy issue, 
similar economies, such as Greece and Portugal, adopted different strategies. These 
points signify the significance of state agency, rather than the importance of the nature 
of political economy. The same picture emerges if one focuses on corporate tax cuts. 
Ireland adopted in the second half of the 1990s the most pro-active stance among 
EU15 member states, reducing its corporate tax between 1995-2003 by 69% (from 
40% in 1995, to 12.5% in 2003). In the same period the UK reduced its corporate tax 
only by 9% (from 33% to 30%), whereas in Spain the corporate tax remained 
unchanged at 35%, in Greece it was reduced by 12.5% (from 40% to 35%), and in 
Germany it was reduced by 30.3% (from 56.8% to 39.6%) (source: European 
Commission)
 13. Again, here the most significant „adaptation‟ takes place in a 
genealogically compatible economy (Ireland), while the second most significant 
change takes place in a non-compatible economy (Germany). On the other hand, the 
UK (a compatible economy) and Greece (a non-compatible economy) adopted modest 
changes, and there was no change in Spain (a non-compatible economies). As above, 
the nature of political economy does not seem able to offer a persuasive answer for 
the above variations; nor the conceptualisation of globalisation as a pre-determined 
phenomenon seems to help us understand the nature of, and the dynamics at play in, 
the above changes.  
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The above analysis strengthens the significance of conceptualising globalisation as a 
hegemonic discourse, for, such a conceptualisation suggests an independent and 
significant reordering effect even on political economies that are „genealogically 
compatible‟ with the hegemonic discourse. Thus the outcome of the hegemonic 
rearrangement at the domestic level is far from being pre-determined, because the 
hegemonic discourse itself is not pre-determined and because the materialisation of 
the hegemonic discourse depends on the actions and perceptions of domestic social 
actors. Hence, a hegemonic discourse redefines the conditions in which agency takes 
place, it does not replace this agency or neutralise its capacity for change. It is this 
agency-centred and undetermined effect of the hegemonic discourse that breaks down 
the circular, self-proved explanation of the goodness-of-fit approach.   
 
Another significant problem of the goodness-of-fit hypothesis is that it is based on a 
fixed conceptualisation of models of political economy. An uncritical endorsement of 
these models, however, runs the risk of reducing the factor of political economy to an 
ahistorical construct, incapable of strategic adaptation, evolution or learning, i.e. 
beyond change and social agency (see also Crouch, 2005). Yet, for instance, in Britain 
in the 1980s, Thatcher was functioning within a traditional Anglo-Saxon political 
economy but, at the same time, was changing the nature of this political economy by, 
among other, reversing the long-established tradition of Keynesianism, putting an end 
to the powers of the trade unions, and minimising welfare state provisions. Along the 
same lines, the rise of the social partnership in Ireland after 1987, although it took 
place within specific politico-economic arrangements, in fact transformed Irish 
political economy. Thus, a new hybrid politico-economic model emerged that 
combined a deregulated Anglo-Saxon political economy with a centralised, 
consociational mechanism of interest representation – what in the Irish public 
discourse started to be referred to as the „Irish model of political economy‟. 
Therefore, the factor political economy should always be examined in dynamic terms 
and not as an end-product.  
 
It is also important to note here that the specific nature of Irish political economy 
makes it even more difficult to assess the role of political economy in the 
communication of hegemonic discourses (Ireland should be treated here as a 
representative case of a wider group of states). For, Irish political economy is based 
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on a rather dualistic structure. A liberal, highly flexible and foreign owned sector 
(product of the magnificent increase in inwards foreign direct investments in the 
1990s), coexists with an indigenous, more traditional and regulated, manufacturing 
sector (Hardiman, 2002; Enterprise Strategy Group, 2004). Therefore, the 
assumptions about the „compatibility‟ between the Irish political economy and 
globalisation, and the role that this compatibility has played in the materialisation of 
globalisation are further problematised, for, even if they were true, they would not 
really capture the whole of Irish economy.  
 
Finally, even when the direction of changes generated by a hegemonic discourse is 
more conducive to the tradition of a certain political economy, one would expect that 
social groups that are on the losing-side of the changes underway would protest and 
try to block the relevant governmental policies.  To put this differently, the fact that 
the contemporary Irish political economy has Anglo-Saxon characteristics (in terms of 
the degree of regulation and state control domain), does not mean that the changes in 
the domestic environment and the domestic distribution of power, produced by the 
hegemonic discourse of globalisation would escape, if not public protest, at least 
public deliberation.  In this regard one must not conflate the (non-) power of an actor 
with its willingness to dispute or deliberate on existing and changing practices.  For 
instance, the fact that the ICTU and its leaders and members have been socialised 
within a rather unregulated economic environment, does not mean that when ICTU‟s 
suggestions and preferences are marginalised in the policy process, ICTU will not 
protest, or will not, however unsuccessfully, try to block governmental policies that 
are disadvantageous for its members (e.g. an 81% increase in part-time employment).  
The same goes for the ICTU‟s preferences.  The fact that the Irish labour market is 
flexible in comparison to most of its European counterparts, does not mean that Irish 
labour force has a fixed preference in favour of flexibility practices.  
 
Based on the above analysis it can be argued that the nature of political economy 
cannot fully account for the materialisation of globalisation discourse. Thus, although 
the importance of the nature of the political economy in the hegemonic discourse 
communication process is undisputable, a clear correlation between the nature of the 
political economy and the nature of the communication/materialisation of a 
hegemonic discourse cannot be established.                         
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Is the nature of domestic structures enough to account for the materialisation process 
of hegemonic discourses?  
 
To get a picture that can better account for the different facets of the hegemonic, one 
could qualify the role of the nature of political economy with a study of the case and 
time specific (domestic) conditions that affect the capacity and willingness of the 
various actors to dispute or deliberate on the practices and policies generated by the 
hegemonic. 
 
In this regard, the existence of a highly-institutionalised, well-functioning and ever-
inclusive social partnership, cannot but be considered instrumental in the explanation 
of the communication of globalisation discourse in Ireland.  Thus, although Irish 
political economy is usually classified as an Anglo-Saxon, it was characterised 
throughout the period under investigation, as mentioned above, by a strong and 
expanding consociational institutional base, a defining characteristic of Continental 
political economies (see Murphy, 1999; O‟Donnell and O‟Reardon, 2000; Hardiman, 
2002).  It seems that this distinctive characteristic of Irish political economy played a 
crucial role in the way in which the hegemonic discourse of globalisation was 
materialised.  Such that it could be argued that the effects that were generated by the 
production of new winners and losers, inherent in any hegemonic discourse 
materialisation process, were mediated, negotiated and resolved, at the level of this 
consociational mechanism, ever-dominant in the Irish politico-economic life.  Along 
these lines it could also be argued that the fact that many heads or representatives of 
public institutions in Ireland, have grown up together or have personal/family 
relationships, due to the small size of the Irish society, must have facilitated the above 
dynamics.  
 
Does this mean that the structure of interest representation can account for the 
hegemonic discourse communication process? Based on our evidence, the answer is 
no. While the structure of interest representation tells us important things about how a 
public discourse is reproduced, it tells us little about actors‟ preferences and 
understandings.  To put this more clearly, although the study of the structures of 
interest representation tells us much about where and with whom the actors speak, it 
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tells us little about what they say.  Thus, it seems that the problem mentioned with 
regard to the nature of political economy, also applies to the structures of interest 
representation. The fact that a political economy is based on consociational 
institutional arrangements does not mean that the social actors that are negatively 
affected by the hegemonic discourse will not react; it just means that their reactions 
will be brought into and negotiated within the framework of these institutional 
arrangements. Yet, in the case of Ireland no such negotiation was found. It was not 
that the social partners were negotiating economic globalisation policies among 
themselves, but rather that the promotion of these policies was taken as a given; that 
is, it was beyond discussion and public or intra policy group deliberation. I do not 
mean here to ignore or downgrade the important role of social partnership in fostering 
consensus around economic globalisation policies. But, the important issue here is not 
how this consensus was fostered but what allowed this consensus to emerge in the 
first place. Greece for instance did not only lack a social partnership to foster 
consensus around economic globalisation policies, but most importantly it lacked 




Nature of political economy plus structures of interest representation. Is a combined 
explanation enough?  
 
It could be argued that it was on the one hand the genealogical compatibility between 
the globalisation discourse and the Irish political economy, and on the other hand the 
strong consociational base of the Irish political economy that led to the apolitical facet 
of the hegemonic, observed in the Irish case.   Respectively, it could be argued that 
the effects from the incompatibility between the hegemonic discourse of globalisation 
and the Greek political economy, were exacerbated by the overly fragmented and 
particularistic structure of interest representation that characterise the Greek politico-
economic life. Thus it may be the case that the solution to our puzzle is based on the 
combination of the two factors examined above, i.e. the nature of political economy 
and the nature of the structures of interest representation.   
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The combination of a nature-of-political-economy perspective with a case-specific, 
domestic institutional arrangements analysis appears to improve significantly the 
understanding of the nature of hegemonic discourse materialisation.  It takes into 
consideration, not only factors concerning the degree of genealogical compatibility 
between hegemonic discourses and national political economies, but also factors 
concerning the way in which different societies negotiate social change domestically, 
i.e. whether there are strong or weak intermediation structures of interest-
representation, and whether these structures promote consensus building, or rather 
enhance the reproduction of social divisions and antagonisms. Yet, still this combined 
explanation does not seem sufficient to account for why there was no public or intra 
group deliberation/negotiation in the case of Ireland.  
 
Accordingly, the Irish case seems to suggest that the nature of political economy and 
the structures of interest representation cannot on their own account for all facets of 
the hegemonic; they cannot offer a conclusive explanation of the hegemonic discourse 
materialisation process. To address this problem, some scholars have suggested that 
we need to take into consideration the different political culture that exist in different 
countries. In Ireland this would include the „non-ideological‟ and „consensus-driven‟ 
public life, whereas in Greece it would point towards the „high degree of abstraction 
and polarisation‟ that traditionally characterises public debates. Yet, the factor 
political culture seems to obscure rather than elucidate the communication of 
globalisation discourse. In the case of Ireland, for instance, it seems to ignore the 
turbulent industrial relations that have defined most contemporary Irish economic 
history. It also fails to provide us with a convincing answer as to why this consensus 
did not take place earlier (or later), especially since the infrastructure of the social 
partnership was in place since the early 1970s.  
 
It seems that in order to grasp the apolitical facet observed in the Irish case, one needs 
to dig deeper into the reasons that affected social actors‟ understandings, and their 
capacity and willingness to dispute or deliberate on the meanings and practices of the 
globalisation discourse.  Following such a deep, case-specific, analytically bottom-up 
route it becomes apparent that the social technology (i.e. the hegemonic) that in the 
Greek case came at a certain historical period to be communicated and materialised as 
a new zone of contestation concerning the redistribution of wealth and power, in the 
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Irish case it was communicated and materialised as a historically unique economic 
miracle, a social technology of prosperity and wealth-generation (for the Irish 
„economic miracle‟ see Walsh 2000;  for a critique see Allen 2000).   
 
Indeed, as it has been well documented, during the 1990s and up to the first half of the 
2000s Ireland was the fastest growing economy in the OECD (see various Economic 
Surveys of Ireland published by the OECD). It evolved from a „cohesion fund‟ poor 
country, to a most prosperous economy. Its GDP per capita as a percentage of the EU 
average increased from 69.7% in 1990 to 135.1% in 2002 – a 93.8% increase within 
almost a decade! In addition to growth rates, the development of a number of macro-
economic indicators was also impressive. Unemployment fell from 13.4% in 1990 to 
4.3% in 2002. Industrial production (excluding construction) grew with an average of 
13.5% during 1992-2000, whereas the EU15 average was 1.7%. The general 
government gross debt reduced from 94.2% of GDP in 1990 to 32.7% in 2002 (all 
data are from the European Economy, no 6/2004, published by the European 
Commission). Thus, from the „poorest of the rich‟ in 1988 (Economist’s Survey, 
1988), Ireland became „Europe‟s shining light‟ (Economist’s Survey, 1997) in the 
1990s. 
 
For sure, the above numbers tell us nothing about social and income inequalities, and 
indeed few analysts would dispute the fact that the economic miracle maintained, if 
not exacerbated, such inequalities (see Kirby, 2002; Allen, 2003). Yet, one can hardly 
downgrade the positive impact the rapid economic growth had on Irish population, in 
absolute terms. Along these lines, Whelan and Layte (2004: 103) note with regard to 
social mobility: „Ireland has remained a highly unequal society in terms of the 
distribution of income. However...economic change and, in particular, the economic 
boom of recent years has been associated with substantial absolute [positive] social 
mobility‟ (see also Smith, 2005: chapter 2). The positive impact the economic miracle 
had on the living conditions of the great majority of the Irish population is also 
reflected in the shift in the mood of public opinion captured in Eurobarometer surveys 
at the end of the 1980s. In particular, during 1980-1987, to the question whether the 
next year will be better or worse in comparison to the current one, the Irish were 
among the most pessimistic Europeans (the percentage of negative replies varied 
between 45% and 55%). Yet, after this period a radical change of attitude, from 
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pessimism to optimism, is observed. Thus, after 1987 Irish were constantly among the 
most optimistic Europeans (and had the highest percentage of positive replies in 1988, 
1990 and 1994, and the second lowest percentage of negative replies in 1994 and 
1996). This significant shift of attitude cannot but be related to positive personal 
experiences and absolute gains in living conditions.  
 
Following this reasoning, it can be argued that it was this economic miracle 
experience, that defined what was conceivable and what was non-conceivable, what 
was part of politics and what was beyond politics, what in general could be spoken of 
and how, within the Irish public discourse of the time. Additionally it can be argued 
that this prosperity was so deeply and widely felt in Ireland, that it marginalised or 
made (temporarily) irrelevant any social clash as to who gets what. That is, the great 
majority of the population was experiencing such an absolute gain in the conditions of 
their everyday life, that until the end of the 1990s, relative-gains considerations 
remained beyond public deliberation.  
 
The explanation proposed here goes beyond the nature of political economy, and 
differs from explanations focused on structures of interest representation. It is an 
explanation grounded on changes in the material environment, but the emphasis is on 
how and why real people experience specific changes in specific ways. In this regard, 
in the case of Ireland some further historical contextualisation adds important 
information to the nature of the materialisation of globalisation discourse.  It can thus 
be argued that the economic miracle was translated in Ireland into a positive social 
shock that disrupted the continuity of a generations-long collective memory and social 
self-portrayal that was driven by the potato-famine of the 19
th
 century. Hence, it was 
this positive social shock that „placed‟ the practices, mechanisms and policies of the 
economic miracle beyond the sphere of the socially contested and negotiable, beyond 
the sphere of the political. Gradually, however, and despite the fact that wealth was 
still generated at an unprecedented historical pace, the effect of this positive shock 
started to fade away and give its place to relative gains and wealth-disparity 
considerations. The counterfactual bottom line here is that if the specific historical 
experiences were not there, the positive shock would not have had the impact it did. 
On this basis, it can also be argued that one cannot easily generalise the findings of 
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the Irish case, as the factor „economic miracle‟ should not be expected to have exactly 





This paper aspired to make a contribution to the existing literature on globalisation 
through a detailed examination of two case studies. In the case of Ireland, it offered an 
independent validation of the important research already made by Nicola Smith 
(2005). In this regard, Smith‟s main position on the all-powerful discourse of 
competitiveness in the Irish politico-economic life is reaffirmed. Yet, according to our 
findings, Smith has overemphasised the role and importance of the concept of 
globalisation in the Irish public discourse. The analysis of the Greek case was rather 
the first attempt to map how globalisation discourse emerged in this country in the 
1990s. The analysis of these two case studies led us to two different facets, two 
different routes of materialisation of globalisation discourse. Yet, we also saw how a 
highly politicised materialisation route led to specific policy-agenda reifications, and 
how a highly apolitical route, was gradually politicised.  
 
The second aspiration of the paper was to examine the role of political economy and 
domestic institutions in the above materialisation processes. The conclusion here is 
that although these two factors play an important role in hegemonic discourse 
materialisation, they cannot account on their own, combined or separately, for the 
materialisation of globalisation discourse. Along these lines it was argued that a 
complete reading and understanding of the different facets of the hegemonic and its 
materialisation cannot but finally rest upon historical and case-specific factors and 
characteristics. State agency, changes in the material environment (e.g. the economic 
boom in Ireland), and specific historical experiences that influence the way in which 
these changes impact on specific societies (e.g. the traditional socio-economic 
deprivation, and negative self-images in Ireland), are also crucial elements here.  
    
Finally, the countries examined and the findings presented here point to the 
significant limitations of the models-of-political-economy approach to international 
political economy. These models not only fail to capture the nature of the states under 
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examination but also obscure significantly the social dynamics that govern social 
change in world politics and economics. In this regard the conclusion of this paper 
seems to raise a broader issue. Singular factors such as types of political economy or 
types of domestic structures may be of minor analytical value or even meaningless if 
examined as separate variables, independent from the socio-historical systems in 
which they are embedded. Thus the failure of political economy and domestic 
structures to account for the materialisation of globalisation discourse, observed in 
this paper, may not just be a call to include more factors in our analysis but a call for 
new ways of thinking. It may be a call for new theoretical and analytical perspectives 
that shift the emphasis from singular factors to the social systems that define the 
existence and govern the co-existence of these factors. The purpose here would not be 
to examine which factor matters most in the communication of hegemonic discourses 
but rather to scrutinise the system that governs the co-existence of the different factors 
and thus to elucidate the rules that define the social formation/transformation of 
different societies.   





















                                                 
1
 See also the papers presented at the ECPR joint session workshop: „Elites discourses in Globalisation 
and Europeanisation‟, Nicosia, April 2006, available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr. Furthermore, the 
volumes National Perspectives on Globalization and Regional Perspectives on Globalization, edited by 
Paul Bowles and Henry Veltmeyer, forthcoming by Palgrave Macmillan, will also be an important 
contribution to the existing literature.  
 
2
 Relevant developments include the „Essen strategy‟, agreed in the European Council in Essen 
(December 1994), the „Concluding Report‟ of the „Molitor group‟ (June 1995), and a relevant UNICE 
report (October 1995).  Furthermore, with the treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, competition became a 
basic target of the European Union. 
 
3
 In the case of SEV, I examined the speeches of its Chairman, during the annual General Assemblies 
of the Federation, for the period 1998-2001. In the case of IBEC, I examined statements of its 
executives (i.e. the Chairpersons or the Directors General) that made a reference to globalisation and 
were published in The Irish Times or the Irish Independent (i.e. the two best selling Irish broadsheets), 
for the period 1996-2002. 
 
4
 Author‟s interview, 20/04/02.  Iason Stratos was the Chairman of SEV for the period 1992-2000. 
 
5
 See indicatively: „Tigers eat up the Dinosaurs‟, „Troops in: Bust AIB‟s top Brass‟, „Tigers Vs 
Dinosaurs‟ and „Did the Unions dictate the budget?‟ in The Sunday Independent, December 12, 1999, 
and April 2, April 16 and December 10, 2000, respectively.  
 
6
 A significant point of convergence in workers‟ discourses was also the references to the importance 
of the „social dimension‟ of the European model of capitalism (see for instance, Enimerosi, no 24, 
April 1997: 5; ICTU, 2001: 9-10; ICTU, 2001a: 61). 
   
7
 The study of Archbishop‟s discourse was based on 62 speeches, letters and interviews, available on-
line in the archive of the Church of Greece. See http://www.ecclesia.gr.   
 
8
 The study of Cardinal‟s discourse was based on material published in Irish press. The database Lexis-
Nexis Executive was used to collect all the articles published in Irish newspapers that made a reference 
to Cardinal Connell, along with one of the following key-words: „global‟ or „globalisation‟ or „identity‟ 
or „flexibility‟ or „Celtic Tiger‟ or Europe, for the period 1996-2001. 40 articles were found and 
analysed. Approximately one fourth of these were articles or speeches by Cardinal Connell. 
  
9
 See Desmond Connell „Human Face of Poverty Reflected in Homeless Statistics‟, available at: 
http://www.dublindiocese.ie/Releases/releases.htm.   
 
10
 See The Irish Times, February 14, 1998, p. 3.  
 
11
 The main difference between the two discourses was Archbishop Christodoulos critique of 
„Americanisation‟ and „American cultural imperialism‟. See for instance Christodoulos, 1999. 
 
12
 Most Irish analysts consider The Irish Times as the most credible source for tracing and analysing the 
issues prevailing in Irish politico-economic scene. 
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